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1 Concepts of Anxiety: A Historical
Reflection on Anxiety and Related
Disorders
GERRIT GLAS
University Hospital Utrecht and State University of Leiden, The Netherlands
INTRODUCTION
There is perhaps no better way to illustrate the changes in twentieth-century
psychiatric thinking, than by delineating the history of the concept of anxiety.
One aim of this introductory chapter is to briefly summarize these changes and
to sensitize to the social, conceptual and philosophical issues which are
involved here.
At the same time, elucidating the historical and conceptual background of
our contemporary view of anxiety may also be fruitful for the understanding of
anxiety itself, as a conglomerate of concrete phenomena. It may remind us,
among others, of the elusive nature of the experience of anxiety, the immense
diversity of its (sometimes idiosyncratic) behavioral and physiological manifes-
tations, its mingling with other forms of psychopathology, and, not to mention
more, the existential dimension of the experience of anxiety.
In summary, the focus of our historical review will be both on theory and on
the phenomenon of anxiety itself. The history of the concept of anxiety can be
seen as a reflection of changes in the self-conception of psychiatry. At the same
time, these changes show the phenomenon of anxiety from different angles.
ETYMOLOGY
The word anxiety probably derives from the Indo-Germanic root Angh, which
means to constrict, to narrow, or to strangulate (Lewis, 1967). This root reap-
pears in the Greek word anchein which means to strangle, to suffocate, or to
press shut. The root Angh has survived in Latin, for example in angor (suffoca-
tion, feeling of entrapment) and anxietas (overconcern; shrink back fearfully),
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and in some contemporary European languages. In spite of the numerous con-
notations and subtle shifts of meaning, the perception of tightness and constric-
tion of the throat and of the chest can still be recognized as a central element of
meaning in terms derived from the root Angh in these modem languages.
Fear derives from the German stem freisa orfrasa. Phobia and panic on the
other hand have a Greek background. Panic refers to Pan or Panikos, the Greek
god of the forests and of shepherds, who was thought to have caused panic
among the Persians at Marathon.
FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE MIDDLE OF THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY
First of all, it should be realized that from Antiquity to the middle of the nine-
teenth-century medicine did not recognize the need for a systematic distinction
between anxiety and depression. This does not mean that the numerous mani-
festations of anxiety and depression have not been observed and described. On
the contrary, the Corpus Hippocmticum and other medical texts, like those of
Galen, Burton and nineteenth-century alienists, contain many lively descrip-
tions of people suffering from conditions which now would be identified as
anxiety or depressive disorder. For centuries, however, these conditions were
encompassed by the broad concept of melancholia.
This concept, of course, refers to the so-called humoral theory, according to
which disease results from a disturbance in the balance of four bodily fluids:
blood, yellow bile, black bile and phlegm. The earliest formulation of this the-
ory can be discovered in the Corpus Hippocraticum, a series of 70 medical texts
dating from the fifth century BC, which are attributed to Hippocrates and his
pupils. Melancholia, or black bile disease, is only briefly mentioned here, with
fear and despondency as its dominant characteristics. The full description of its
effects can be found in the work of Galen (AD 131-201), more than five cen-
turies later. Galen ascribed the anxiety seen in melancholies to a dark-colored
vapor emanating from black bile, as a result of local heating in the hypochon-
drium. This smoky vapor, he thought, rose up into the brain, producing fear and
mental obscuration.
As external darkness renders almost all persons fearful, with the exception of a
few naturally audacious ones or those who were specially trained, thus the color
of the black bile induces fear when its darkness throws a shadow over the area of
thought [in the brain] (Galenus, p. 93).
According to later writers of the Galenic school, the heating process also
explains the motor restlessness and other behavioral phenomena of this
(hypochondriacal) form of melancholia.
During the Middle Ages humoral pathology was systematized. One of the
effects was a sharper distinction between melancholia as a result of an excess
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(or heating) of natural black bile and melancholia being caused by an excess of
unnatural black bile. This unnatural black bile was thought to be produced by
combustion, or degeneration, of one of the four bodily fluids. Preoccupation of
death, for instance, was associated with combustion or degeneration of black
bile, mania with degeneration of yellow bile, apathy with degeneration of
phlegm.
Medical literature on melancholia culminates in Robert Burton's The
Anatomy of Melancholy, published in 1621. Greatly indebted to ancient medi-
cine and philosophy, this peculiar and sometimes rather bizarre work compiles
all knowledge of that time on the subject of melancholia. Sorrow and fear are
considered to be the major causes of melancholia, sorrow being related to dis-
aster in the present and fear to disaster in the future. In discussing the symp-
toms of melancholia. Burton shows to be acquainted with many of the forms of
anxiety known today: fear of death; fear of losing those who are most import-
ant to us; anxiety based on paranoid delusions and delusions of reference; fear
associated with depersonalization; delusional depersonalization; hypochondria;
anticipatory anxiety; hyperventilation; agoraphobia; and many specific pho-
bias, such as fear of public speaking, fear of heights, and claustrophobia
(Burton, 1621, pp. 442-449).
It was ultimately at the end of the eighteenth century that humoral pathology
lost its grip on medical thinking. Pathological anatomy had expanded greatly.
More emphasis was put on clinical observation and description. It was a time
of sensualism and of a fascination with sensibility and sensory perception.
Popular notions in medical literature of that time, like irritability and tone,
betray a preoccupation with the hypersensitivity of the nervous system and of
the senses. The central nervous system gradually replaced the blood, the liver
and the spleen, from which, until then, melancholia was thought to originate.
Today, the idea of temperament is all that remains of humoralism, as a
metaphorical expression for the experiences of despondent people.
THE TURNING POINT: AGORAPHOBIA AND ANXIETY
UNDER CHtCUMSTANCES OF WAR
Flemming's Über Praecordiaiangst (On Precordial Pain), which dates from
1848, is probably the first medical text devoted to a non-phobic form of anxiety
as a more or less specific entity (Schmidt-Degenhard, 1986). It was, however,
not this publication which became a turning point in the conceptual history of
anxiety and anxiety disorders. For that, we have to wait until 1870, when in a
short span of time three articles appeared which would become particularly
authoritative. First of these is a short article by Benedikt (1870) entitled Über
Platzschwindel (On Dizziness on Squares). It described a patient who, as soon
as he entered a street or a square, was overcome by dizziness. Terrified of col-
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lapsing mentally and gripped by a tremendous fear he never dared to pass
through that place again. Benedikt, thus, believed the anxiety to be secondary to
the dizziness of this patient. Two years later, that view was challenged by
Westphal (1872), who was the first to use the term agoraphobia in a technical
sense. Westphal stated that it was the anxiety that caused the dizziness. He
based his hypothesis on clinical observation. Interestingly enough, he was very
much aware that the three patients he described were not afraid of streets or
squares as such. He stressed the unfounded nature of their anxiety. Theirs was
rather a fear of anxiety itself, an anxiety that only much later was linked to par-
ticular situations. Westphal's critique on Benedikt anticipates a debate that
would reach its climax more than a century later in the controversy about the
provocative role of bodily sensations (and their interpretation) in the origin of
panic attacks.
In the same period, the American cardiologist Da Costa (1871) wrote another
classic on a quite different form of anxiety. Auscultating the cardiac murmurs of
more than 300 exhausted soldiers returning from the front, he heard some
abnormalities, for which he coined the term "irritable heart". The patients com-
plained of palpitations, pain in the chest and extreme fatigue. Heightened ner-
vous irritability, he believed, was the cause of the condition. The ensuing
debate, which became particularly intense during and after the two World Wars,
centered around the nature of the intolerance to physical exertion. Thomas
Lewis, who studied many such cases among British soldiers in World War I and
to whom we owe the term effort syndrome, rejected the one-sided emphasis on
the heart and the presumed cardiac origin of the complaints. Although many
agreed with this, there still was no unanimity about what actually lay behind the
syndrome. Some emphasized the role of psychogenic factors (Culpin, 1920;
Wood, 1941), others argued for a multifactorial origin of the condition, pointing
to constitution, previous infections, heavy exercise and neurotic mechanisms as
precipitating factors (MacKenzie, 1916, 1920; Jones and Lewis, 1941; Jones,
1948).
The debate was settled provisionally by two studies: one by the cardiologist
Paul Wood (1941), the other by (Maxwell) Jones (1948), better known as the
protagonist of the therapeutic community. According to Wood the symptoms of
the "irritable heart" were also prevalent in peacetime and closely resembled
those of anxiety neurosis. Especially susceptible were patients who, in child-
hood, "clung too long to their mothers' skirts" (Wood, 1941, p. 846). Owing to
parental overconcern or comments by their physician, these patients would have
learned to interpret various normal physiological symptoms as signs of physical
danger or heart disease. One should be reminded that this was said long before
the formulation of attribution theory (MacKenzie, 1920). Jones concurred with
this in his award-winning study. Although he emphasized the reality of the
intolerance to physical exertion, he interpreted it as the result of (subcon-
scious) avoidance. His physiological investigations demonstrated namely a
slightly smaller increase of the level of lactate in patients compared to normal
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controls at the subjective maximum of exertion. From this he concluded that the
patients stopped exerting themselves before they reached their physiological
maximum. The effort syndrome, in fact, was an effort phobia. Jones developed
a form of group psychoeducation, using groups of about 100 patients.
Experiences with these groups would become important for his later ideas on
the therapeutic community.
Wars have contributed greatly to our knowledge of anxiety disorders, in par-
ticular the so-called traumatic neuroses. In addition, they direct our attention to
the social influences affecting psychiatric diagnosis. The term effort syndrome,
for instance, can be seen as a reflection at the diagnostic level of the military
importance of the capacity to deliver physical effort.
NEURASTHENIA AND ANXIETY NEUROSIS
In the last decades of the nineteenth century, a new concept, neurasthenia,
gained ground. George M. Beard, the American advocate of this idea, consid-
ered neurasthenia to be a functional disorder characterized by a deficiency of
"nervous energy". This deficiency could express itself in a multitude of symp-
toms, mainly at the level of the central nervous system, the digestive tract and
the reproductive tract (Beard, 1884, 1890). Although not highly prominent
among these symptoms, morbid fear and phobias were nevertheless ranked
among the most difficult symptoms to cure. The concept of neurasthenia is
closely linked to Beard's view of American society, which supposedly generat-
ed much more excitation of the nervous system than did European society.
"American nervousness", one of Beard's favorite synonyms for neurasthenia,
was a typical product of an industrial society in which the upper classes were
doomed to a hectic lifestyle.
Beard's contribution to psychopathology has to be sought in his meticulous
description of even the most idiosyncratic symptoms and in his attempt to focus
psychiatry's attention to patients that could not be found in the hospitals and
mental institutions of that time. Neurasthenia was a disease of the street,
according to Beard. The idea of nervous energy, with its clearly Romantic and
vitalistic background, was abandoned after several decades, as well as the reflex
(or irradiation) theory which said that local functional disorders could be trans-
mitted to other organs by the sympathetic nerve.
The history of the classification of anxiety disorders since the time of Beard
can be seen as a peeling-away of layers of the concept of neurasthenia. Anxiety
neurosis was the first stratum to be laid bare under its surface. Next came all
sorts of classificatory subdivisions within anxiety neurosis (Tyrer, 1984).
Hecker initiated the above-mentioned process in a classic article on anxiety
states in neurasthenia (Hecker, 1893). He had noticed that the anxiety attacks
experienced by many neurasthenia sufferers were not accompanied by any sub-
jective feeling of anxiety. Hecker used the term "larvirt" (larval; larva-like) to
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denote this absence of a feeling of anxiety. The term "abortiv", on the other
hand, indicated the interrupted, incomplete nature of the attacks. These patients
did not show the full range of physical symptoms. The picture described by
Hecker bears some resemblance to the so-called "limited symptom attacks" in
present-day literature on panic disorder.
In 1895, Sigmund Freud, with reference to Hecker, joined the critics of
Beard's broad concept of neurasthenia. However, in being more explicit about
pathogenesis, Freud went a step further than Hecker (Freud, 1895a, 1895c). He
regarded the distinction between neurasthenia and anxiety neurosis to be essen-
tial, since anxiety neurosis had a different pathogenesis and required a different
treatment. Neurasthenia was a disorder of the way in which the so-called
somatic-sexual excitation was released, whereas anxiety neurosis was primarily
a disorder in the psychic processing of such excitation.
In the case of anxiety neurosis, Freud imagined that there was a build-up of
pressure on the walls of the male seminal vesicles. When this pressure exceeded
a given threshold, it was transformed into somatic energy and transmitted, via
neural pathways, to the cerebral cortex. Under normal conditions, sexual "fantasy
groups" became charged with this energy, leading to sexual excitement (libido)
and the pursuit of release. Anxiety neurosis involved a blockage in the psychic
processing of this somatic sexual tension. Such a blockage might arise through
abstinence, for example, or due to the use of coitus interruptus, or because sexu-
al fantasies had simply failed to take shape. Somatic sexual tension was thus
deflected away from the psyche (the cortex) and directed to subcortical paths,
finally expressing itself as "inadequate actions". These inadequate actions most
characteristically occurred during an anxiety attack.
The pioneering article in which Freud detached anxiety neurosis from neuras-
thenia includes a description of the symptomatology of the various forms of anxi-
ety which is still valid today (Freud, 1895a). Freud cited anxious expectation as
the core symptom of anxiety neurosis. He also distinguished between specific
phobias, agoraphobia, free floating anxiety and anxiety attacks. The latter were
spontaneous in nature and were described as purely somatic phenomena (Freud,
1895c, pp. 368-369). The aforementioned distinctions anticipated the now gener-
ally accepted classification of specific phobias, agoraphobia, generalized anxiety
and panic disorder. Freud was not alone in anticipating DSM-III-R. As the authors
of DSM-HI-R have acknowledged, striking similarities are also to be found in the
sixth edition of Emil Kraepelin's handbook of psychiatry (Kraepelin, 1899;
Spitzer and Williams, 1985).
Furthermore, it is interesting that Freud considered agoraphobia to be char-
acterized by a fear of panic attacks, and not by fear of streets or squares per se:
ce que redoute ce malade c'est l'événement d'une telle attaque [what the patient
fears is the occurrence of such an attack] (Freud, 1895b, p. 352)
Ultimately however, it was not these interpretations of anxiety neurosis which
would survive. Freud's second theory of anxiety, in which anxiety was interpreted
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as a signal of inner threat, would have much greater influence (Freud, 1926).
This second theory had already announced its arrival by around 1895, albeit in a
somatic guise. Freud asked why non-processed sexual excitation should express
itself specifically in the form of anxiety. In answering this question, a glimpse is
afforded of something which much later would become more explicit. Unlike
real anxiety, which is based on the perception of external danger, neurotic anxi-
ety is a reaction to inner threat. The core of this inner threat is an inability to
process "endogenously" created (sexual) excitation (Freud, 1895a, p. 338). On
another occasion Freud put it as follows:
Anxiety is the sensation of the accumulation of another endogenous stimulus, the
stimulus to breathing (Freud, 1894, p. 194)
It is sometimes forgotten that elements of the above hypothesis also appeared in
Freud's signal theory. There also the basis of all anxiety is biological helpless-
ness, i.e. the helplessness of the child with respect to its own drive impulses (cf.
Freud, 1926, p. 68).
Although the signal theory also concerns the satisfying of needs, it does not
relate primarily to sexual needs but rather to those associated with the instinct
for self-preservation (cf. Freud, 1933, pp. 100-101). Object loss, the most
clear-cut threat recognized by this instinct, becomes the psychological prereq-
uisite for inducing the ego to release a small quantum of anxiety in order to
restore a favorable balance of pleasure and pain. The threat of object loss
remains linked to the biological state of being at the mercy of one's drive
impulses. This linkage is mediated by remembrance symbols which, via sepa-
ration and birth, ultimately refer to an archaic inheritance of hereditary anxiety
responses. In anxious patients, the symptom of gasping for air is no longer
seen as a mitigated orgasm but rather as the rudiment of the cry of a newborn
child (Freud, 1926, p. 168).
In a negative sense, Freud's second theory of anxiety was of great signifi-
cance within the classification debate. His view of anxiety as the invariable out-
come of all kinds of unresolved neurotic conflict illustrates the nosologically
non-specific character he attributed to anxiety. The influence of this view partly
explains why the classification of anxiety and anxiety disorders became such a
neglected theme in the period between 1930 and 1960.
This is not meant to detract from Freud's merits. In the field of anxiety theory,
these merits lay particularly in the concept of anxiety as a reaction to inner threat.
This idea, which was without precedent in Freud's days, permanently changed the
face of psychiatry. Freud thereby gave a wholly individual treatment to the funda-
mental distinction between (object-less) anxiety and (object-linked) fear, a theme
which for the rest was to find its way into psychiatry via another route
(Kierkegaard, Jaspers and existential phenomenology). Moreover, Freud's
approach was not limited to the psychoanalytic school. At least one of the con-
temporary currents in cognitive psychology has built explicitly upon Freud's pio-
neering concept of anxiety as an inner threat (Beck, 1976; Beck et al., 1985).
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PSYCHASTHENIA
One of the most remarkable studies in the history of the classification of anxiety
is Pierre Janet's Les Obsessions et la Psychasthénie (The Obsessions and
Psychasthenia), dating from 1903. This work, written in an elegant and still
readable style, not only offers an overview of all possible manifestations of
pathological anxiety, it also contains numerous vivid descriptions of conditions
which today are known as depersonalization, somatoform disorder, hypochon-
dria, stereotyped movement disorder and chronic fatigue syndrome.
Janet argues against the tendency of many of his colleagues to divide the
symptom clusters into separate diagnostic entities. Indeed, he presents a classi-
fication of his own, by making a distinction between three types of psychasthe-
nia: obsessive thoughts, irresistible movements (compulsions, tics, outbursts of
temper as a result of the inability to complete the compulsions) and visceral
anxiety (generalized anxiety, panic, phobias and even pain syndromes). These
types in their turn are subdivided into various clinical states. Janet nevertheless
emphasizes the close ties between these states. In the course of their illness
many patients show symptoms of conditions belonging to different types.
Moreover, suppression of the target symptoms of one type often leads to the
emergence of symptoms belonging to another type of psychasthenia. Blocking
of the obsessions, for instance, heightens the anxiety and may induce compul-
sive behavior. Resisting one's compulsions, on the other hand, often leads to
cardiac palpitations and the sensation of suffocation.
The real innovative element of Janet's study, however, is his attempt to fit
his numerous observations in a general theory of psychological functioning.
Already in the Introduction Janet declares his sympathy with the French psy-
chologist Ribot, who was one of his intellectual fathers and who had made a
plea for the close collaboration between medicine and psychology. Common
to all patients, says Janet, is a disturbance in psychological functioning, the
so-called psychasthenic state or psychasthenia. This state is characterized by
three distinctive features, namely:
1. a "sense of incompleteness" ("sentiment d'incomplétude");
2. a diminishing or loss of "the sense (or function) of reality" ("la fonction du
réel"); and
3. exhaustion (Janet, 1903, p. 439).
It is not easy to perceive what Janet exactly meant with the first two of these fea-
tures. Roughly speaking, the sense of incompleteness refers to the subjective feel-
ing that something is missing in one's actions, feelings or intellectual functioning.
It is a sense of incapacity and of being unsuccessful. Whatever one does, it seems
useless and not to come to an end. Doubt, hesitance, and endless rumination dom-
inate one's activities. Depersonalization, feelings of doubleness and unreality,
restlessness, apathy and disgust complete this list of manifestations.
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With regard to the second feature, the diminishing of "the sense (or function)
of reality", it is at first sight even harder to imagine what Janet had in mind.
Citing Spencer, he defines it as "the coefficient of reality of a psychological
fact" (Janet, 1903, p. 487). Rephrasing this statement, one could say that certain
classes of psychic functioning can be assessed with respect to their degree of
reality, i.e. to a certain quality of psychic functioning in relation to actual tasks
and circumstances. In sum, the "function of reality" refers to the capacity to be
present, spontaneous and effective, particularly in the domain of voluntary
action, attention and perception.
Janet, after all, discerns five hierarchical levels of psychological functioning:
the function of reality at the upper level; then indifferent activities (routine acts
and vague perceptions), the imaging function (memory, imagination, abstract
reasoning, and daydreaming) and visceral emotional reactions; and finally, at
the lowest level, involuntary muscular movements. The quality of psychological
functioning is determined by the so-called psychological tension, the psychic
correlate of the nervous energy, which Beard and Freud had alluded to.
Lowering of this tension initially leads to a lack of attention, concentration and
other synthetic mental functions, in other words, to a loss of "la fonction du
réel" and—subsequently—to a disruption of routine activities at the second
level. The psychasthenic state is the result of precisely this lowering of psychic
tension ("abaissement de la tension psychologique"; Janet, 1903, p. 497).
From this, it will become clear that anxiety is by no means the central symp-
tom in Janet's account of the psychasthenic state. Anxiety occurs when psychic
functioning is disturbed from the upper level down to the fourth level, that of
the visceral emotional reactions. Anxiety, consequently, belongs to the most ele-
mentary of the mental functions:
Underneath the anger, fear, and love, there is an emotion, that is not specific any
more, that is a sum-total of vague respiratory and cardiac complaints, which don't
evoke in the mind the idea of any inclination or any particular action. That emo-
tion is called anxiety, the most elementary of the mental functions (Janet, 1903,
p. 486; translation by the author)
Clearly, psychasthenia encompasses a broad range of clinical phenomena,
including the anxiety disorders of our time. The psychasthenic state, however, is
determined by a breakdown of only the highest level of psychic functioning.
This implies that even in the case of phobias, obsessive-compulsive disorder
and panic attacks, a central role should be assigned to feelings of unreality,
incompleteness, ineffectiveness and depersonalization, and not to feelings of
fear and anxiety. Emotions and emotion theory play only a secondary role in
Janet's description and explanation of these disorders.
Janet doesn't deny the occurrence of panic attacks in some cases of
psychasthenia (cf., for example, his interesting description of nocturnal panic
attacks; p. 247). But these can only be accounted for by the assumption of a
temporary and more severe collapse of the psychological tension, leading to
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disturbances at the third and fourth levels. Fear, on the other hand, is a more
complex and differentiated emotion, involving psychic activity of the higher
levels, such as imagination, perception and goal-directed behavior. Fear as such,
however, is the expression of activity at the fourth level of psychic functioning.
From a psychological point of view, Janet was far ahead of his time, by
pointing to the importance of disturbances in the domain of attention and per-
ception and their relation to the sense of the self. Psychology and psychiatry
had to wait till the 1980s, before "attentional bias" became a topic of some
interest in empirical research of the anxiety disorders.
CLINICAL STUDIES
After 1900, relatively few psychiatric monographs were devoted exclusively to
anxiety and anxiety disorders. One exception was the profound clinical study by
Störring (1934). Several authors occupied themselves with conceptual ques-
tions, based on clinical observations, for example Goldstein (1929) and
Kronfeld (1935). Other names, which should be mentioned in this context, are
those of Hoche (1911), Kornfeld (1902) and Oppenheim (1909).
Next, reference should be made to several studies arising from particular the-
oretical points of view. These include not only the psychoanalytical studies by
Stekel (1932), Bitter (1948) and Riemann (1961), but also the anthropological
studies of von Gebsattel (1954a, 1954b, 1954c) and Tellenbach (1976).
Finally, one should be reminded of those studies, which were carried out in
the periods around both World Wars and which were exclusively devoted to
traumatic forms of anxiety, such as the publications on "Schreckneurosen" and
"Schreckpsychosen" (from the German Schreck: terror) (cf. Bonhoeffer, 1919;
Kleist, 1918; Panse, 1952).
Instead of summarizing these studies, I will focus the discussion on two
themes: the rejection of the James-Lange theory of emotion and the debate
about the distinction between fear and anxiety.
With regard to the first theme, there seemed to be a significant resistance
amongst clinicians to the James-Lange theory of emotions. Bodily changes,
according to this theory, instead of resulting from subjective feelings, are actual-
ly the cause of feeling and emotion. Sensory perceptions transform into emotion
by the awareness of bodily changes (cf. James, 1884, pp. 189, 204, 1890,
p. 450). It is usually assumed that James postulated a temporal sequence between
bodily changes and emotional perceptions. Although this is not entirely correct,
interpreters have focused mainly on this side of the Jamesian account. Perhaps
this was the result of the association of James' view with the theory of the Dane
Lange, who indeed emphasized the temporal priority of bodily changes.
Clinicians criticized the James-Lange theory just on this point, by referring
to the immediacy of the experience of anxiety. According to Störring, the ex-
perience of anxiety is not mediated by prior bodily perception. Kornfeld (1902)
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(not to be confused with Kronfeld) and Hoche (1911) lodged the same objec-
tion, on descriptive grounds. Störring, however, was not entirely consistent on
this point since he also spoke of anxiety as a reaction to, or a processing of, sen-
sations associated with specific organs, thus suggesting a temporal priority of
organic changes (Störring, 1934, pp. 24, 32). Kraepelin and Lange's authorita-
tive handbook rejected the James-Lange theory on theoretical grounds, both
because of its psychophysical dualism and its disregard for central regulatory
processes. An emotion such as fear of suffocation could be both somatic and
psychological in origin. According to Kraepelin and Lange, the origin of this
fear (whether lack of oxygen, hypercapnia, acidosis or frightening events) is
irrelevant to the quality of the emotion itself. In all cases, the central issue is a
threat to the patient's existence as a biological entity rather than any perception
of bodily changes (Kraepelin and Lange, 1927, p. 470). It should be noted,
however, that James was too much of a Darwinist to be accused of psychophysi-
cal dualism.
In summary, it can be said that clinical psychiatrists resisted the
James-Lange theory mainly on clinical grounds. Clinical observation simply
contradicted the presumed primacy of bodily changes.
In discussing the second theme, that of the distinction between anxiety and
fear, consideration should be given to Kurt Goldstein's observations of patients
with organic brain damage. The majority of Goldstein's patients were victims of
World War I. He observed (1929) that, when faced with overly complex tasks,
these patients displayed a catastrophic reaction consisting of a wide range of
physiological and psychomotor symptoms. Goldstein believed that, even though
it was not subjectively experienced as such, this condition could best be inter-
preted as an expression of anxiety.
Whilst Goldstein's patients were unaware of the fact of their anxiety, the
appearance of their physical symptoms coincided with the failure to accomplish
their tasks. Strictly speaking, their anxiety was neither a reaction to failure nor a
reaction to an awareness of failure. Anxiety—and this was the essence of
Goldstein's interpretation—was quite literally the actual manifestation of fail-
ure. Goldstein concludes that generally spoken anxiety is the expression of a
frustrated urge for self-realization.
This reference to the urge for self-realization was particularly popular
amongst those contemporary authors who drew their inspiration from vitalism.
Although similar references can also be found in Freud's later work (Freud,
1933), it was actually the colossal presence of Charles Darwin behind the
scenes which inspired this line of thought. However, Goldstein was not thinking
of the survival of the species, or that of the individual, in purely Darwinian
terms. The urge towards self-realization was more than a purely biological reali-
ty. It also found expression, for example, in the productive creativity shown by
children and adults in mastering the world. Anxiety was referred to as a disrup-
tion of the stability of personality ("Erschütterung (des) Bestandes der
Persönlichkeit"; cf. Goldstein, 1929, pp. 415-416). Ultimately, however,
14 ADVANCES IN THE NEUROBIOLOGY OF ANXIETY DISORDERS
Goldstein failed to fully clarify the conceptual status of this urge towards self-
realization.
In conceptually more explicit accounts by other authors we find a scheme in
which personality is divided into an impersonal (biological) substructure and a
personal superstructure. The substructure is described in vitalistic terms whilst the
superstructure is analyzed in terms derived from existential phenomenology.
Examples of this can be found in work by Arthur Kronfeld, Felix Krueger, Philipp
Lersch, and, to a lesser extent, H. C. Rümke. According to Kronfeld (1935), anxi-
ety is based upon a disintegration of the personal superstructure. In its most
extreme form, this disintegration is expressed as psychotic anxiety. However, the
type of anxiety which Kronfeld preferred to have in mind was existential rather
than psychotic:
Anxiety is the mental expression of the existential annihilation of the integrity
("Einheitsform") of the person. Its archetype is the fear of death, the anxiety related to
vital destruction. (Kronfeld, 1935, p. 378; translation by the author)
Such statements only become comprehensible when it is realized that Kronfeld
rejected the link between anxiety and threat, or, in other words, the relation
between object-less anxiety and object-related fear. Anxiety, in the true sense of
the word, is not the counterpart of safety, but of the synthetic activity of the I,
the person in its striving for one-ness and meaningfulness. In the same way,
anxiety is not an intensified form of fear, nor the result of the perception of a
threatening situation. It is a fragmentation of the self, leading to the outbreak of
chaotic and formless biological forces.
The work of these anthropologically inspired clinicians is still of consider-
able interest, as a contrast to mainstream psychiatric thinking, at that time and
nowadays, which tends to favor a biological interpretation of objectless anxiety.
ON THE WAY TO DSM-III
The study of anxiety was not a high priority in the period from 1930 to 1960. In
addition to the previously mentioned influence of psychoanalysis, which
described anxiety as a non-specific phenomenon, the assumption that anxiety
occupied a low position in the hierarchy of psychiatric symptoms also had a
part in this (Tyrer, 1984). Not only did anxiety occur in practically all psy-
chopathological syndromes, it also marked the lower boundary of psycho-
pathology, where this bordered on normality.
Jablensky (1985) adds to this that classification traditionally has been an area
of interest for institutional psychiatry. The relative neglect of the classification
of anxiety disorders can be seen as a reflection of the fact that, as a rule, patients
with neurotic anxiety were never hospitalized.
This status quo gradually changed during the 1950s. At that time, the psy-
chophysiological investigation of emotions continued along the lines of the
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James-Lange theory. Ax (1953), for instance, attempted to draw a distinction
between the emotions of anxiety and anger, on the basis of their peripheral
physiological symptoms. In the same period, the anxiolytic effect of benzodi-
azepines was discovered, resulting in a flood of research into the effects of these
chemicals on the central nervous system (Sternbach, 1980). Wolpe (1958) intro-
duced systematic desensitization as a form of behavior therapy, thereby giving
new impetus to the treatment of people with anxiety and phobic disorders. Roth
(1959) described a form of depersonalization associated with severe anxiety and
phobic phenomena. This was the so-called "phobic anxiety-depersonalization
syndrome". Although it usually developed in the wake of a psychotrauma, this
picture could sometimes occur spontaneously. The EEGs of one-sixth of all
patients revealed the presence of temporal epileptic symptoms.
Finally, at the end of the 1950s Klein discovered that panic attacks in agora-
phobic patients could be blocked using imipramine (Klein, 1964, 1980). This
marked the beginning of an immense stream of experimental, pharmacological,
clinical, longitudinal, epidemiological, genetic and familial research into the
existence and course of panic disorder.
With this expansion of psychopharmacological research, increasingly strin-
gent criteria for the definition of psychiatric syndromes were drawn up. Thus,
psychopharmacological and biological psychiatric research constituted a pow-
erful impetus for the development of the Feighner Criteria (Feighner et al.,
1972). These, together with the Research Diagnostic Criteria (Spitzer et al.
1975, 1978) formed the basis of the DSM-ni-R (American Psychiatric
Association Committee on Nomenclature and Statistics, 1980, 1987). The
emphasis on descriptive precision led to the demarcation of various forms of
anxiety and to an abandonment of the concept of neurosis, which was consid-
ered to be too vague. Neurasthenic neurosis was discarded. Anxiety neurosis,
phobic neurosis and obsessive-compulsive neurosis were combined under the
heading of anxiety disorders. Post-traumatic stress disorder, a newcomer, was
added to the anxiety disorders. Anxiety neurosis was subsequently split up into
panic disorder and generalized anxiety disorder, whilst phobic neurosis was
divided up into agoraphobia, simple phobias and social phobia (cf. Spitzer and
Williams, 1985).
In spite of the non-theoretical nature of DSM-IH, this change nevertheless
heralded in a fundamentally different approach to the psychopathology of anxi-
ety. DSM-III bode farewell, not only to the psychodynamic conflict model, but
also to a broader tradition in which anxiety was associated with more or less
subtle disruptions of personality structure. It was replaced by a finely grained
description and classification of more superficial symptomatology. This result-
ed in a shift from the predominantly dimensional or dispositional approach
which characterized the neurosis model, to a typological or categorical
approach to psychopathology. Panic disorder represents the most outstanding
example of this development.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Looking back at our historical review, one may discern three lines in the inter-
pretation of pathological anxiety which are still of topical interest today.
First and foremost, there is the medical tradition, which from Antiquity until
now dominates the theoretical literature on anxiety and which, at least in the
last 150 years, tends to favor a biological approach.
Secondly, the concept of anxiety as an inner threat can be recognized, a concept
which is defended by psychoanalysts and contemporary cognitive psychologists.
Finally, the existential concept of anxiety is worth mentioning, a concept
which dates from the seventeenth (Pascal) and nineteenth (Kierkegaard) cen-
turies, and which via existential phenomenology inspires the work of anthropo-
logical psychiatrists and existential psychotherapists in our age.
These three traditions are not at all on their way to converge. Contemporary
psychiatry gives the appearance that medical tradition is still enlarging its
domain, at the expense of the psychoanalytic and existential traditions.
It should be noted, however, that psychiatry as a medical discipline has
incorporated elements of the psychoanalytic tradition, besides all sorts of
behavioral and cognitive explanations. Behind the surface, consequently, some
of the old controversies are still under discussion, for instance those concerning
the role of bodily perception in the genesis of panic, those concerning the pri-
macy of biological or psychological explanations, and, not to mention more,
those concerning the nature of classification.
The classification debate itself may serve as an example of the shifting
boundaries of psychiatry. One of the issues in this debate is where to draw the
boundary between normality and pathology. We have noticed to what extent this
boundary was influenced by social conditions, such as war circumstances
(effort syndrome), and the appreciation of the pressures of daily life (neurasthe-
nia).
Clinicians and researchers are currently fascinated with the biological
approach to anxiety. As such, this comes as no surprise, since this approach
seems to bring the promise of control and of tangible results. It is the relation
between psychiatry as a science and psychiatry as a clinical enterprise which is
especially at stake here. As scientific disciplines, neurobiology and pharmacolo-
gy tackle problems abstractively and objectively. This implies that there is, by
definition, a gap between the research findings in these disciplines and clinical
reality. Scientific constructs do not relate to this reality in its entirety, but mere-
ly to aspects of psychopathological syndromes. Identification of these con-
structs with reality, i.e. reification, almost inevitably leads to distortions in
description and diagnosis. The conceptual history of anxiety illustrates the
repeated recurrence of forgotten ideas. These were eliminated in the process of
abstraction, only to return via the back door. One may recall, for instance,
Westphal's and Freud's view on fear of anxiety as the nucleus of agoraphobia;
MacKenzie's and Wood's emphasis on the causative role of cognitive attribu-
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tions; Janet's description of disturbances in attention and perception as central
phenomena in psychasthenia.
The gap between scientific explanation and clinical reality, rather than being
a barrier to our understanding, offers a space for creative insight and heuristic
probing. This gap, instead of short-circuiting it, should be kept open.
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